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Let There Be False Light: Resisting the
Growing Trend Against an Important Tort
Nathan E. Ray*
According to the traditional conception of the privacy torts,
as described by Professor William L. Prosser,1 there are four
forms of invasion of privacy: intrusion upon seclusion or soli-
tude,2 publication of embarrassing private facts,3 appropriation
of name or likeness, 4 and publicity placing an individual in a
false light before the public eye.5 Minnesota has cautiously
waited one hundred and eight years to recognize any of these
torts, approving the first three in Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.6
* J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398 (1960).
2. In recognizing a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court declared that an invasion of privacy occurs when one "'inten-
tionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of an-
other or his private affairs or concerns * * * if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person." Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d
231, 233 (Minn. 1998) (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]).
3. Publication of private facts is an invasion of privacy when one "'gives
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another * * * if the matter
publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.' Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT,
supra note 2, § 652D).
4. The appropriation tort protects an individual's identity and is committed
when one "appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of an-
other." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652C).
5. False light publicity occurs when one:
gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light * * * if (a) the false light in which the
other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652E).
6. See id. at 234-35. The facts of the case provided an excellent opportu-
nity to recognize the torts. On a vacation to Mexico, Melissa Weber's sister
took a snapshot of her naked showering with fellow traveler Elli Lake. After
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Yet Minnesota is in the vanguard when it comes to rejecting
"false light," boldly joining only two other states.7
Whereas the first three forms of invasion of privacy protect
easily recognized interests such as solitude, confidentiality, and
control over how one's name or image is used,8 the false light
tort makes an easy target for criticism. This is due in large
part to its "hazy philosophical underpinnings"9 and a poorly-
understood protected interest. Many critics also believe the
tort conflicts with First Amendment free speech guarantees
and overlaps with the established tort of defamation. 10 False
light is nevertheless distinct from the other privacy torts and
from defamation. Repudiating it would be a harsh example for
other states if a cogent account of its protected interest shows it
to be vital and worth preserving.
attempting to have the five rolls of film from their trip developed at the local
Wal-Mart, they received a notice that one or more of the photographs had not
been printed due to their "nature." Within months, it appeared that the two
young women were among the few people in town not to have seen the picture.
Their sexual orientations were questioned, and a friend reported that a Wal-
Mart employee had shown her a copy of the photograph. The supreme court
reversed the lower court ruling that Minnesota did not recognize the common-
law tort of invasion of privacy, creating a new cause of action. See id. at 235.
7. Texas and North Carolina have explicitly rejected false light. See in-
fra Part I.B (discussing Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994), and
Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984)).
8. See generally Prosser, supra note 1 (describing in detail the four
branches of the privacy tort). An example of intrusion upon seclusion might
be a hidden video camera in an area where a person would have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, such as a bathroom or locker room. Since we expect to
be alone and unobserved in such situations, the law will provide a remedy
when our solitude is violated. Likewise, a cause of action for publication of
private facts might exist where medical records of a person who is not a public
figure are published. People generally agree that such information is entitled
to confidentiality, and accordingly the law provides a remedy when the media
or other entity crosses this line. Finally, a person's name or likeness might be
misappropriated where he has established a reputation as a talented or note-
worthy personality, and his image is used without his permission to endorse a
product. The rationale often cited for this tort is a proprietary interest. Oth-
ers should not be permitted to profit from the work an individual puts into
creating a valuable persona or reputation. In contrast, there is little agree-
ment about the interest protected by false light. See infra Part I.C. Prosser
simply asserts that it protects an interest in reputation, the same interest
defamation protects. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
9. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The
Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 451 (1989).
10. See infra Part L.A (describing First Amendment concerns raised by
false light); Part I.B (discussing rejections of the tort by state courts in part
because of its similarity to defamation).
LET THERE BE FALSE LIGHT
False light invasion of privacy involves exposing an other-
wise private individual to unwanted and false publicity. 1 By
contrast, defamation, with which false light is often compared,
involves damage to reputation from a false communication, not
necessarily publicized, that exposes an individual to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule.12 Many misrepresentations are both de-
famatory and an invasion of privacy, but in the absence of in-
jury to reputation, Minnesota has eliminated any protection for
a sense of privacy, peace of mind, or the right to decide how we
present ourselves to the public. Without a cause of action for
invasion of privacy by false, highly offensive publicity, deserv-
ing plaintiffs without viable defamation claims have no avail-
able remedy. For example, in Braun v. Flynt,13 an amusement
park entertainer whose act consisted of inducing "Ralph the
Diving Pig" to jump into a tank with her by enticing it with a
bottle of milk was featured without her consent in a porno-
graphic magazine. The magazine obtained pictures of her act
and published them alongside other pictures and cartoons
having overtly sexual themes.' 4 The performer won a jury ver-
dict against the publication for false light invasion of privacy.
Moreover, false light publicity, unlike defamation, might
even improve reputation. It can nevertheless be deeply offen-
sive, as when it presents an individual as more virtuous or he-
roic than he really is. Undeserved praise might cause the same
discomfort and embarrassment to a person with integrity as
11. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652E.
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the
other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,
and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.
Id.
12. See id. § 558.
To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and de-
famatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publica-
tion to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the
part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement ir-
respective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by
the publication.
Id. A "defamatory statement" is one that "tends so to harm the reputation of
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third
persons from associating or dealing with him." Id. § 559. For analysis of the
differing elements of defamation and false light, see infra Part II.B.
13. 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984).
14. See id. at 247.
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does an unmerited attack and could create an impression that
such a person invited the unearned honors. In a well-known
case, a professional baseball player won a verdict for invasion
of privacy when a fictionalized children's biography depicted
him as having earned military honors for heroic deeds during
World War II that he did not actually receive. 15 In Minnesota,
these plaintiffs and others 16 would have been without recourse.
In rejecting false light, the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
lied on the reasoning of other state courts without a careful and
critical examination. That reasoning does not withstand close
analysis, and this Note will attempt to supply the considera-
tions missing from these decisions and demonstrate the need
for a false light tort. Part I traces the evolution of the tort in
the United States and explains the origins of the criticism and
confusion that currently surround it. Part II shows that false
light neither overlaps with defamation nor threatens disput-
able First Amendment concerns, and attempts to clarify the in-
terests the tort protects. This Note concludes that the false
light tort serves a unique need and that other states should not
follow Minnesota's lead in rejecting it.
I. BIRTH OF A MISUNDERSTOOD TORT
Professor Prosser has told the story that the famous 1890
Warren and Brandeis article17 advocating a common-law tort of
invasion of privacy was inspired by Boston journalists crashing
the society wedding of Warren's daughter.18 The story has of-
ten been repeated by other legal scholars. 19 One commentator,
15. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842-43, 843 n.*
(N.Y. 1967). The case arose under the New York privacy statute, which state
courts had construed to allow false light claims. See infra note 47.
16. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
17. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
18. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 383-84. Prosser wrote:
It was the era of "yellow journalism," when the press had begun to re-
sort to excesses in the way of prying that have become more or less
commonplace today .... [Tihe newspapers had a field day on the oc-
casion of the wedding of [Warren's] daughter, and Mr. Warren be-
came annoyed. It was an annoyance for which the press, the adver-
tisers and the entertainment industry of America were to pay dearly
over the next seventy years.
Id. at 383 (citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966 (1964); Hyman Gross,
Privacy and Autonomy, in PRIVACY 169, 177 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
716 [Vol. 84:713
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however, points out that Warren's daughter, "the face that
launched a thousand lawsuits,"20 was only six at the time, and
the newspaper Prosser credits with provoking Warren only
mentioned him twice in the previous seven years, in connection
with unimportant matters.21 Despite uncertainty surrounding
the exact origins of the seminal Warren and Brandeis article,
scholars often consider it the most influential law review article
ever written.22 It was the source of a new area of law, becoming
the basis for statutory or common-law causes of action in forty-
eight states, now including Minnesota. 23
Warren and Brandeis argued that an implicit right to pri-
vacy had evolved at common law, and the time had come for
American courts to recognize it explicitly.2 4 Apart from passing
mention in an 1888 treatise on torts of the right "to be let
alone, 12 5 no coherent notion of privacy existed in American
Chapman eds., 1971); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren
and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 329 n.22 (1966); Alec
M. Barinholtz, Note, False Light Invasion of Privacy: False Tort?, 17 Sw. U. L.
REV. 135, 137-38 (1987).
20. Prosser, supra note 1, at 423 ("One is tempted to surmise that [Warren's
daughter] must have been a very beautiful girl... the face that launched a thou-
sand lawsuits.").
21. See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1335, 1349. Gormley also debunks a different myth attributing Warren's ire
to photographers snapping perambulator pictures of his children. Another
author, however, notes that two newspapers in 1890 did run items in their
gossip columns describing in "restrained" tones a wedding breakfast hosted by
the Warrens for a cousin. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavy-
weight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 291, 295-96 (1983).
22. See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 876 (1979); Bloustein, supra note 19, at 971; Prosser,
supra note 1, at 383; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Musings on a Famous Law
Review Article: The Shadow of Substance, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 823
(1991); Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclo-
sure Tort, 85 KY. L.J. 147, 147 (1996); Lucy Noble Inman, Comment, Hall v.
Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of Invasion of Privacy by Truthful Publica-
tion ofEmbarrassing Facts, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1474, 1478 (1988).
23. Only North Dakota and Wyoming still lack a cause of action for inva-
sion of privacy. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234
(Minn. 1998).
24. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 204-05. The authors' im-
mediate concern was the mental distress caused by the "idle gossip" which had
become a standard feature of major newspapers with the rise of yellow jour-
nalism. See Barinholtz, supra note 19, at 138. They urged protection for the
sanctity of private life that went beyond the outward-looking protection of
reputation provided by defamation. See id. at 138-39.
25. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed.
2000]
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law.26 Yet, they argued, courts had provided relief on other
grounds in the absence of causes of action for invasion of pri-
vacy.27 Few courts elected to recognize invasion of privacy in
the beginning, but the tort slowly gained momentum. 28 With
its appearance in the Restatement of Torts in 1939, the trend in
favor of recognition spread quickly to the majority of American
jurisdictions.29 In the terse formulation of the first Restate-
ment, "[a] person who unreasonably and seriously interferes
with another's interest in not having his affairs known to oth-
ers or his likeness exhibited to the public is liable to the
other."30
By 1960, privacy cases had proliferated to a point where
conceptual refinement was needed. It was provided by Prosser
in a law review article second only to Warren and Brandeis's in
influence. 31 Prosser concluded from a survey of over three
hundred cases that invasion of privacy was actually a complex
of four kinds of invasion of separate interests.32 "False light"
1888).
26. See Gormley, supra note 21, at 1343.
27. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 384. Grounds for relief in the older cases
included defamation, invasion of some property right, breach of confidence,
and implied contract. See id. at 384 nn.4-5 (citing Woolsey v. Judd, 4 Duer (11
N.Y. Super.) 379, 11 How. Pr. 49 (N.Y. 1855); Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402,
36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818); Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De G. & Sm. 652, 41 Eng.
Rep. 1171, 1 Mac. & G. 25, 64 Eng. Rep. 293 (1849); Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac.
& W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820); Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch. 209
(1825); Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888)).
28. According to Prosser, the only judicial approval for the tort in the first
fifteen years after its proposal came from lower courts in New York and a
Massachusetts federal court. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 384-85. The Michi-
gan Supreme Court explicitly rejected invasion of privacy in Atkinson v. John
E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 289 (Mich. 1899), followed with rejection in
New York by Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447 (N.Y.
1902). Not until Georgia adopted the tort in Pavesich v. New England Life In-
surance Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), was there precedent in favor of recognition.
See Prosser, supra note 1, at 384-86.
29. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 386. By the late 1950s, the right to pri-
vacy was recognized in some form or other by "the overwhelming majority of
American courts." See id.
30. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 867 (1939). The editors seem
to have recognized the tenuous existence of the new tort, since they sand-
wiched it somewhat ignominiously between the tort of Failure to Furnish Fa-
cilities to a Member of the Public (§ 866) and the tort of Interference with
Dead Bodies (§ 868).
31. See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 19, at 963-64; J. Clark Kelso, False
Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 789 (1992); Barin-
holtz, supra note 19, at 141.
32. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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originated in this article. Prosser's classification ultimately
was adopted by nearly every state recognizing invasion of pri-
vacy at common law,33 and became the formulation for the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.3 4
Prosser traced the origins of the false light theory of inva-
sion of privacy back to a dispute in 1816 between Lord Byron
and a publisher who attempted to circulate an inferior poem
falsely attributed to him.35 Other examples from the older
cases not explicitly employing a false light theory included ficti-
tious testimonials in advertising, spurious books and articles or
ideas contained therein, unauthorized uses of names, and use
of an individual's photograph to illustrate an unrelated point in
a book or article.36 Prosser cited numerous cases in which
plaintiffs prevailed on a wide variety of theories, implying that
courts sometimes awkwardly adapted available theories to pro-
vide relief for what was actually a false light invasion of pri-
vacy.37 In addition, an article by Wigmore in 191638 argued for
33. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d
1317, 1329 (Conn. 1982); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 287
(Idaho 1961); Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979);
Winegard v. Larson, 260 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Iowa 1977); Froelich v. Adair, 516
P.2d 993, 995 (Kan. 1973); Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878, 882-
83 (Md. 1969); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737, 739 (Okla.
1980); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 136 (Pa. 1974).
34. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652; infra text accompanying note
52.
35. See Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 29, 35 Eng. Rep. 851, 851-52
(1816), cited in Prosser, supra note 1, at 398. No basis for the action is indi-
cated in the case, but another commentator argues that the case does not
stand for a theory of false attribution of opinion or utterance as Prosser as-
serts. The case actually involved "passing off," or attempting to sell goods un-
der the false claim that they were manufactured by another, which is how
subsequent cases treat it. See Kelso, supra note 31, at 791-92. Kelso contends
that Prosser's discussion of this and other "false light" cases is misleading, be-
cause rather than admit that his analysis is simply a reinterpretation of older
cases, Prosser characterizes them as already supporting his "new creation."
See id. at 789-90.
36. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 398-99.
37. See id. at 398-99 nn.130-43 (citing, inter alia, Pavesich v. New Eng-
land Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (libel, breach of confidence); Manger v.
Kree Inst. of Electrolysis, 233 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1956) (violation of New York's
civil rights statute); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. Ct. App.
1909) (slander); Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (general right to privacy); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes &
Co., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. C.P. 1957) (unfair competition); Downs v. Swann,
73 A. 653 (Md. 1909) (violation of personal liberties and constitutional rights)).
38. John H. Wigmore, The Right Against False Attribution of Belief or Ut-
terance, KY. L.J., May 1916, at 3. Wigmore states:
2000]
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a right to privacy to protect against certain kinds of false
statements.39 It is a testimony to Prosser's influence that there
are now more than six hundred cases mentioning the false light
tort by name.40 Although only a few of these cases have suc-
cessfully raised false light as the sole claim, the tort is widely
used and, in some situations, provides the only opportunity for
recovery.
A. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE FALSE LIGHT TORT
When states punish a defendant for making false state-
ments about another person, whether using privacy law or
defamation law, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
expression 41 is often invoked. As Justice Brennan said, "erro-
neous statement is inevitable in free debate, and... must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breath-
ing space' that they 'need... to survive.'"42 Whether defama-
tion or false light is at issue, states must balance the demands
of the Constitution with the rights of citizens harmed by mis-
representations made about them.
In dealing with First Amendment concerns raised by these
two torts, the Supreme Court has treated them similarly, but
imposed a higher standard of fault on false light plaintiffs.
When tort law is used to redress injuries caused by speech,
First Amendment values may be undermined because the
threat of litigation and damage awards can lead to over zealous
self-censorship by individuals or the press. This issue first be-
came a constitutional matter in the 1964 defamation case New
I am entitled to be judged in public by my actual opinions and ut-
terances. To have false ones ascribed to me is an injury to my feelings
of self respect. And that is the injury against which I am entitled to
be protected. The right of privacy is really a right to be protected
against a certain kind of injury to feelings. And that is the feature
common to that right and the present one. The right to be protected
against defamation, i.e., against loss of repute and patronage among
other persons, does not here reach the essence of the wrong.
Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).
39. Aside from cases alleging defamation, none of the cases cited by Wig-
more actually involved tort actions, however. See Harvey L. Zuckman, Inva-
sion of Privacy-Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 253, 256 (1990).
40. See Kelso, supra note 31, at 819.
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press ....").
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (second
omission in original) (citations omitted).
720 [Vol. 84:713
LET THERE BE FALSE LIGHT
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.43 Concerned that giving states un-
limited discretion to punish certain kinds of expression would
chill otherwise constitutionally-protected speech, the Court re-
quired public officials suing for defamation to prove that a critic
of their official conduct acted with knowledge of falsity or reck-
less disregard for the truth." This "actual malice" rule was
soon extended to public figures.45
In 1967, Time, Inc. v. Hill46 examined the question of First
Amendment limitations on liability in invasion of privacy
cases.47 Hill expanded the actual malice rule again to protect
freedom of speech in invasion of privacy cases, but did not dis-
tinguish between invasion of privacy and defamation. 48 The re-
sult of Hill is a heightened standard of fault in false light cases.
Defamation permits recovery for merely negligent harm as long
as the plaintiff is not a public figure. False light plaintiffs,
however, must prove knowing misrepresentation or reckless
disregard for the truth.
Because the Court certainly could have declared the false
light tort unconstitutional had it found any insuperable conflict
with the First Amendment, some commentators have declared
43. Id.
44. See id. at 283.
45. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
46. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
47. The case arose when Life magazine ran a story about a Broadway play
based on a hostage ordeal suffered by the plaintiff's family. See id. at 376-77.
The play depicted acts of violence and verbal sexual abuse, although in fact
the escaped convicts who took the family hostage never harmed them, and
treated them with courtesy. See id. The plaintiff sued the magazine under
the New York privacy statute, alleging Life had created a false impression of
the family's experiences by asserting that the play was based on a true story.
See id. at 377-79. The statute actually dealt with what Prosser termed appro-
priation of name or likeness, but state courts had. interpreted it broadly to al-
low recovery where the defendant publicized false information about a private
individual for commercial gain. See id. at 381-83. This amounts to false light
invasion of privacy, although that terminology was not used in the statute or
the opinion. A distinction is unnecessary, however, because the Court ad-
dressed only the issue of constitutional requirements for damage awards,
which would apply regardless of the particular privacy cause of action in a ju-
risdiction. In a later false light case, the Court characterized the cause of ac-
tion in Hill as false light invasion of privacy. See Cantrell v. Forest City
Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249 (1974).
48. Justice Brennan stated that it "serves no purpose to distinguish the
facts here from those in New York Times." Hill, 385 U.S. at 391. Much future
confusion was generated by this failure to distinguish between the legal prin-
ciples governing false light and defamation. See infra notes 80-81 and accom-
panying text.
2000]
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that the Supreme Court recognized the tort.49 Subsequent to
Hill, however, the Court has expressly declined to consider
whether the actual malice standard applies to all false light
cases.50 It is generally assumed that plaintiffs wishing to state
a false light claim must prove the defendant acted with knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.51 This as-
sumption found its way into the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which adopts Prosser's fourfold division of invasion of privacy.
According to the Restatement:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the
other would be placed.52
These elements have been adopted more or less verbatim in
virtually every state recognizing this cause of action at common
49. See Greg C. Wilkins, Comment, The Night the Light Went Out in
Texas-The Texas Supreme Court Rejects the Tort of False Light Invasion of
Privacy: Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994), 26 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 249, 251 (1995) ("In Time, Inc. v. Hill, without using the phrase 'false
light,' the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could recover in a
false light action for invasion of privacy."); Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 385
("[Tihe Justices [in Hill] seemed to assume simply that the legitimacy of the
purposes and scope of the false light action were well-established and turned
immediately to a discussion of the Court's previous defamation deci-
sions. .. ."); see also Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 588 (Tex. 1994)
(Hightower, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe court fails to address the United States Su-
preme Court's acceptance of false light invasion of privacy so long as the plain-
tiff proves that the defendant acted with actual malice .... ").
50. See Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 250-51. Cantrell was the only other false
light case to come before the Supreme Court. The actual malice standard was
satisfied in that case, so the Court may have wanted to avoid the question,
which had proved divisive in the area of defamation since New York Times.
See Ruth Walden & Emile Netzhammer, False Light Invasion of Privacy: Un-
tangling the Web of Uncertainty, 9 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 347, 352
(1987). Like Hill, the case dealt with a very narrow issue, whether the Sixth
Circuit erred in setting aside the jury's verdict in a false light invasion of pri-
vacy case. See Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 251. As a result, Cantrell sheds little
light on any constitutional issues raised by the false light tort.
51. There is currently a good deal of uncertainty surrounding this stan-
dard, however. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652E cmt. d (pointing out
that limits to First Amendment protections afforded the media in defamation
cases since Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), may or may not
apply to privacy cases as well).
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652E.
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law.53 An increasing number of states recognized false light in-
vasion of privacy after the second Restatement was published,
and the future of the tort seemed secure.
B. LAND O'LAKE: REJECTING FALSE LIGHT IN THE STATE
COURTS
Minnesota's rejection of false light invasion of privacy is
the latest in a short series of state court decisions disapproving
the tort. Beginning in 1984, the tide in favor of recognition be-
gan to turn with the North Carolina decision of Renwick v.
News & Observer Publishing Co.,54 the first of a small handful
of cases to reject false light. The two themes in all of these de-
cisions are the purported similarity between false light and
defamation, and the false light tort's potential for First
Amendment infringement.
The Renwick court, relying on Prosser's characterization of
the interest protected by false light as "reputation" and his ac-
knowledgment of significant overlap with defamation,55 held
that an action for false light invasion of privacy did not exist in
North Carolina. 56 In addition, the court concluded that any
such right of recovery would "add to the tension already exist-
ing between the First Amendment and the law of torts."57 It
also reasoned that because the excesses of "yellow journalism"
which so irked Warren and Brandeis in 1890 were supposedly
now greatly ameliorated by formal training in journalism and
ethics, any additional remedies for plaintiffs did not justify
burdening the press with "constitutionally suspect" claims for
relief.58 The court stated that "nothing in the First Amendment
53. For a sampling of state cases relying on the Restatement's formula-
tion, see supra note 33. Because Prosser coined the term "false light" and
served as the Reporter for the second Restatement, there is essentially no
other authority from which these elements could have been derived.
54. 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984). In Renwick, a newspaper reported that
an associate dean at UNC Chapel Hill claimed 800 black students were denied
admission in a three year period, even though race-based concessions allowed
blacks to be admitted with SAT scores 20% lower than the class average and a
projected grade point average of only 1.6. See id. at 407. The dean claimed
that the newspaper incorrectly reported his statement and created a false im-
pression that he was "an extremist, a liar, and... irresponsible in his profes-
sion." Id. at 409.
55. See Prosser, supra note 1, at 400. Prosser believed both torts protect
the interest in reputation. See id.
56. See Renwick, 312 S.E.2d at 412.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 413.
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mandates that members of the news media be responsible or
professional."59
Similar reasoning led the Texas Supreme Court to reject
the false light tort ten years later, when the Fifth Circuit certi-
fied the issue on a claim by a convicted killer who was unfa-
vorably portrayed in the Houston Chronicle.60 The court held:
We reject the false light invasion of privacy tort for two reasons: 1)
it largely duplicates other rights of recovery, particularly defamation;
and 2) it lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany ac-
tions for defamation, thus unacceptably increasing the tension that
already exists between free speech constitutional guarantees and tort
law.61
The court determined that because both false light and defama-
tion claims generally involve false statements, false light recov-
ery would be substantially duplicated by other established
torts.62 In addition, defamation actions are subject to numer-
ous restrictions serving to safeguard freedom of speech.6 3 Thus,
"[plermitting plaintiffs to bring actions for false light without
the limits established for defamation actions may inhibit free
speech beyond the permissible range. On the other hand, no
useful purpose would be served by the separate tort if these re-
strictions are imposed."6" The court also included a final ra-
tionale raising the possibility of a chilling effect on speech if
false light were recognized. The majority opined that the prob-
able danger to freedom of the press outweighed the "marginal"
benefits of adding another tort to protect plaintiffs against
nondefamatory speech.65
Closely following the Texas court, Minnesota declined to
recognize false light because of its purported similarity to
defamation and conflict with the First Amendment. 66 The only
significant difference it found between defamation and false
light was that defamation protects reputation in the external
world, whereas false light protects harm to one's inner self.67
Because false light otherwise overlaps with defamation but
lacks the same restrictions protecting free speech interests, the
59. Id.
60. See Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1994).
61. Id. at 579-80.
62. See id. at 580-81.
63. See id. at 581-82.
64. Id. at 582.
65. See id. at 584.
66. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
67. See id.
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court concluded that any additional protection it provided to
plaintiffs was insufficient to overcome possible danger to free
speech.68 Likewise, any untrue and hurtful publicity actionable
under false light but not defamation would be too uncommon to
outweigh the risk of chilling speech.69 Although Lake briefly
canvassed some of the history of the privacy tort, the interests
protected by the right to privacy were not discussed in any de-
tail.
C. ATTEMPTS To DEFINE THE INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE
FALSE LIGHT TORT
Legal scholars have yet to provide a satisfactory rationale
for the false light tort. As the above cases and others suggest,70
the current state of law on false light invasion of privacy is a
"haystack in a hurricane," to use Judge Biggs's oft-quoted ref-
erence to privacy tort law in 1956.71 The false light tort should
protect interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the wide-
spread suspicion that it is redundant and inconsistent with
freedom of speech. Even the majority of states recognizing
68. See id. at 236. Noting restrictions on defamation actions cited by the
Texas court, including privileges for public meetings, good faith, and impor-
tant public interest and mitigation factors, the court concluded that because
most false light claims are actionable in defamation it did not make sense to
recognize false light with similar restrictions. See id. at 236 & n.27.
69. See id.
70. Some jurisdictions that recognize invasion of privacy under common
law declare that false light simply has never existed there, but have not gone
so far as to foreclose the possibility that it might eventually be allowed. See,
e.g., Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Mo. 1986) ("It may
be possible that in the future Missouri courts will be presented with an appro-
priate case justifying our recognition of the tort.... [But] we hesitate under
the facts of this case to decide whether or not to denominate a separate tort for
'false light invasion of privacy.'"); Elm Med. Lab, Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532
N.E.2d 675, 681 (Mass. 1989) ("This court has not recognized [false light inva-
sion of privacy] and does not choose to do so now."); Yeager v. Local 20, Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, 453 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ohio 1983) ("Under the facts of the
instant case, we find no rationale which compels us to adopt the 'false light'
theory of recovery in Ohio at this time."); Brown v. Pearson, 483 S.E.2d 477,
484 (S.C. 1997) ("[No South Carolina case has recognized this tort."). In addi-
tion, California appears to have gutted the tort without explicitly rejecting it.
See Kenneth Franklin, Comment, Invasion of Privacy: False Light Offers False
Hope, 8 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 411, 415 (1988) (arguing that Fellows v. National
Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1986), by holding that false light claims are
subject to the same special damage requirements as defamation, effectively
terminated the tort because the interests it protects are emotional or mental
and thus not readily quantifiable).
71. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.
1956), cited in Bloustein, supra note 19, at 962.
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false light, however, have had difficulty justifying the tort by
the interests it serves to protect. Proposed interests have in-
cluded freedom from scorn and ridicule, freedom from embar-
rassment, humiliation and harassment, freedom from personal
outrage, freedom from injury to feelings, freedom from mental
anguish, freedom from contempt and disgrace, and the right to
be let alone.72
The disarray has been partly attributed to Prosser in spite
of his acclaimed contribution to the law of invasion of privacy. 73
Professor Edward J. Bloustein noted with surprise and disap-
proval that the four privacy torts identified by Prosser protect
four distinct interests, none of which is actually an interest in
privacy.74 Of false light, Prosser wrote: "The interest protected
is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental
distress as in defamation.... There has been a good deal of
overlapping of defamation in the false light cases, and appar-
ently either action, or both, will very often lie."75 If all that
false light accomplished was an increase in the number of
situations where defendants could be liable for harming repu-
tation, however, critics concerned about First Amendment
guarantees might have good grounds for suspicion. Commenta-
tors have found reputation to be an insufficient interest for
false light, because this interest is already protected by defa-
mation law.76 As one critic notes, reputation is by definition
not a privacy interest, so suggesting this interest as a justifica-
tion for the false light tort inevitable raises the question of why
placing someone in a false light before the public is an invasion
of privacy at all.77 Moreover, because false light publicity can
technically be favorable to the subject of the publicity,78 it is
72. See Barinholtz, supra note 19, at 152.
73. See Bloustein, supra note 19, at 964-65.
74. See id. at 965. Bloustein states that Prosser's innovation is in effect a
repudiation of Warren and Brandeis because it suggests that privacy is not an
independent value but "a composite of the interests in reputation, emotional
tranquility and intangible property." Id. at 962.
75. Prosser, supra note 1, at 400.
76. See Bloustein, supra note 19, at 965-66; Bruce A. McKenna, Note,
False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA L.J. 113, 119 (1985).
77. See McKenna, supra note 76, at 119 ("Protection of a reputation inter-
est is inconsistent with the concept of privacy. Privacy law is designed to pro-
tect an individual's mental tranquility.").
78. See supra text accompanying note 15; infra note 121 and accompany-
ing text.
[Vol. 84:713
LET THERE BE FALSE LIGHT
doubtful whether reputation could be the interest protected by
the tort.
By acknowledging a substantial overlap between the new
false light tort and the established defamation tort and claim-
ing that both protect the same personal interest, Prosser
probably contributed to the skepticism with which courts and
scholars view false light.7 9 The Supreme Court may bear some
responsibility for the confusion as well. In applying constitu-
tional restrictions for defamation to false light without analyz-
ing the interests at stake for each tort,80 it created a presump-
tion that defamation and false light are intimately connected
and protect the same personal interest.81
In addition, despite recognition that an analysis of the in-
terests at stake is vital for the continued existence of the tort,82
there is no general agreement among scholars about the inter-
ests protected by the right to privacy, let alone by the false
light tort in particular.83 One commentator has identified four
major interests proposed to account for the necessity of a right
to privacy: the expression of one's personality or essence as a
human being, autonomy or moral freedom, the ability to regu-
late information about oneself and thereby control one's rela-
tionships with others, and a cluster of interests including se-
crecy, anonymity, solitude, repose, sanctuary and intimate
decision.8 4 These interests may be vague and abstract, but few
people dispute the desirability of privacy protections in our so-
79. Cf., e.g., BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 569 (2d ed. Supp.
1999) ("Legally, placing someone in a false light amounts to little more than
defamation. Ostensibly, the tort purports to allow recovery for misrepresenta-
tions and inaccuracies that do not rise to the level of libel or slander."). What-
ever might be the interest protected by false light, defamation obviously pro-
tects the interest in reputation.
80. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
81. See Walden & Netzhammer, supra note 50, at 356.
82. See Bloustein, supra note 19, at 963 ("The need for [a general theory of
privacy] is pressing [because] the conceptual disarray has had untoward ef-
fects on the courts; lacking a clear sense of what interest or interests are in-
volved in privacy cases has made it difficult to arrive at a judicial consensus
concerning the elements of the wrong or the nature of the defenses to it.").
83. "The long search for a 'definition' of 'privacy' has produced a continu-
ing debate that is often sterile and, ultimately, futile." Zimmerman, supra
note 21, at 294 n.9 (quoting Raymond Wacks, The Poverty of 'Privacy," 96 LAW
Q. REV. 73, 75 (1980)).
84. See Gormley, supra note 21, at 1337-38. Authors cited include Roscoe
Pound, Paul A. Freund, Tom Gerety, J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Jeffrey Reiman,
Joseph W. Rebone, Laurence H. Tribe, and Jed Rubenfeld.
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ciety.85 The lack of a clearly identifiable interest has become an
acute problem with false light, however. The tort has been
sharply attacked for not protecting any definable or important
interest, and for being apparently justified only by virtue of its
inclusion in the Restatement. 86
Few legal theorists have attempted to define the interest
protected by the false light tort even though the lack of a
clearly-defined interest may jeopardize its existence.87 No dis-
cussion deals at length, if at all, with the specific interest pro-
tected by the tort of false light. Moreover, none has led to a
consensus, and some attempts have been sharply criticized. 88
85. A notable exception is Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 332-33 (arguing
that gossip about the private affairs of others has traditionally served the
beneficial purpose of preserving and enforcing social norms, and that today
the press might perform this function).
86. See generally Kelso, supra note 31; Zimmerman, supra note 9; Zuck-
man, supra note 39; Barinholtz, supra note 19; McKenna, supra note 76. One
commentator points out:
[Tiorts work well only when fairly broad-based and particularized
agreement exists about what society wishes to protect, deter, and
compensate plaintiffs for. Tort law fails when there is disagreement
on these issues. This society is comfortable with protecting bodily in-
tegrity, with the notion that reputation is a valuable good, and with
the idea that property owners have a largely unassailable interest in
exclusive control.... [Jiudges and juries share a reasonably consis-
tent understanding of these values.
In contrast, privacy is not so well-defined.... [PIrivacy is rich in
symbolic value but has little particularized meaning.
Zimmerman, supra note 22, at 826.
87. For analysis of some scholarly treatments of the false light protected
interest, see infra Part H.C.1.
88. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,
422 (1980) (arguing that much of the scholarly literature on privacy amounts
to some form of reductionism, which denies the utility of thinking and talking
about privacy as a legal concept); id. at 438 ("[We must reject Edward
Bloustein's suggestion that the coherence of privacy lies in the fact that all in-
vasions are violations of human dignity.... [Tihere are ways to offend dignity
and personality that have nothing to do with privacy." (footnote omitted));
Gormley, supra note 21, at 1339 ("Commentators have stumbled over privacy,
and have failed to agree upon an acceptable definition, because they have gen-
erally focused on privacy as a philosophical or moral concept-which allows for
multiplicitous definitions, as seen above-while wholly ignoring privacy as a
legal concept."); Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort
of False Light Invasion of Privacy, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 897 (1991)
("Bloustein's suggestion.., is unsatisfactory. Human dignity can be called
into question by a wide variety of practices in society that have nothing to do
with privacy and for which the law makes no effort to provide a remedy.");
Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 336 n.242. Zimmerman states:
Bloustein has attempted to establish a philosophical foundation on
which to rest the legal protection of privacy.... Although highly in-
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Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to expect a
court deciding whether or not false light should be recognized
to positively accept the tort without qualification. Invasion of
privacy as a cause of action originated in a law review article,
and was identified as encompassing false light in a law review
article-and the need for the tort in the first place is still being
debated in law review articles. With so little consensus in the
legal community, not to mention among lay citizens, there is
wide latitude for judicial rejection of false light. The latest re-
pudiation of the tort by Minnesota may signal a growing trend.
II. DEFENDING A MALIGNED CREATION
The false light tort has zealous detractors.8 9 Lake v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. may portend a slow and needless death for
this new tort if more states decide to follow Minnesota's exam-
ple and reject it.90 That would be an unfortunate development
because the usual arguments dealing with First Amendment
infringement and overlap with defamation are not unassail-
able. With a careful examination of the privacy interest pro-
tected by the tort, courts could conclude that eliminating the
remedy for false light publicity is a harsh response to these two
concerns.
A. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Despite a threat of liability for certain false or misleading
statements, First Amendment guarantees of free expression
and freedom of the press are not threatened by the existence of
the false light tort.
fluential, [his] position has not succeeded in eliminating serious ques-
tions about the value of and justification for [the tort of invasion of
privacy]. Indeed, Bloustein admits that identifying a moral founda-
tion for privacy does not necessarily tell us whether the law should
enforce the right.
Id. (citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., Zuckman, supra note 39, at 256-57 ("Neither the appellate
cases nor the decisions explain why the tort is needed, the interest or interests
protected, how it can be harmonized with defamation, and how it might be
harmonized with the protections accorded freedom of expression."). See gener-
ally Zimmerman, supra note 9; Barinholtz, supra note 19; Kelso, supra note
31.
90. See Victor A. Kovner, et al., Recent Developments in Newsgathering,
Invasion of Privacy and Related Torts, in 3 COM1UJNICATIONS LAW 1998, at
445, 479-80 (P.L.I. Intellectual Property Course Handbook Series No. G-540,
1998) (calling Lake a "remarkable decision," and "perhaps the most significant
setback to those who argue that false light should be cognizable").
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1. Free Speech Is Adequately Protected by Restrictions on the
False Light Tort
Although there are restrictions on the false light tort
meant to safeguard free speech interests, even Prosser, some-
times credited with creating this tort,91 acknowledged the "ex-
tent to which defenses, limitations and safeguards established
for the protection of the defendant in other tort fields have been
jettisoned, disregarded, or ignored [in false light cases]."92
Courts, however, have developed and implemented various
limitations on false light actions since the publication of
Prosser's article in 1960. Plaintiffs must now prove falsity,93
actual malice on the part of defendants, 94 and disclosure to the
public at large.95 In addition, some courts hold that the shorter
statute of limitations for defamation applies to false light ac-
tions.96
Minnesota's outright rejection of false light remains a mi-
nority position. Most jurisdictions disagree with the conclusion
that false light should be abandoned, despite prevalent defama-
91. See Kelso, supra note 31, at 787 ("False light.., was created by Dean
Prosser and sanctioned by the American Law Institute .... [The tort] existed
only in Prosser's mind."); Zimmerman, supra note 9, at 382 ("[I]n a real sense
[Prosser] 'invented' the false light tort by singling out previously unacknow-
ledged features common to most of the nonadvertising appropriation cases.").
92. Prosser, supra note 1, at 422.
93. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
95. See infra note 117.
96. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Cascade Broad. Co., 722 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Wash.
1986) (en banc) (holding that the statute of limitations in libel and slander
cases also applies to false light invasion of privacy). Interestingly, a few
scholars actually welcomed the initial lack of restrictions on false light inva-
sion of privacy. Dean Wade went so far as to argue that the ancient and ab-
struse rules that have evolved in defamation law make false light a better al-
ternative: "[C]ourts should not hesitate to proceed... toward the further
development of the law of privacy. If the law of privacy then absorbs the law
of defamation, it will merely afford a complete 'unfolding' of the idea or princi-
ple behind that law." John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15
VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1124 (1962). False light thus offered "a splendid oppor-
tunity for reform." Id. at 1122; cf Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769
F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1985) (calling many defamation restrictions "fossil
remnants of the torts prehistory in the discredited practices of Star Chamber
and the discredited concept of seditious libel," and welcoming attempts by
plaintiffs to get around them by pleading invasion of privacy). Such views
have not caught on, and the Restatement actually suggests that false light
plaintiffs should not be allowed to evade the long-standing limitations on
defamation actions if the actionable publicity is also defamatory. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652E cmt. e.
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tion-type restrictions that prevent the tort from "unacceptably
derogat[ing] constitutional free speech."97 So far, free speech
has not been noticeably derogated in jurisdictions recognizing
the limited false light tort. Indeed, to judge from today's
popular media, the restraint one might expect from editors and
broadcasters afraid of false light litigation is barely detect-
able.9 8
Even with restrictions, media defendants still may fear
that they are not adequately protected against litigation costs
imposed by flimsy false light claims. It is undoubtedly true
that misrepresentations putting plaintiffs in a false light but
not amounting to libel or slander are more difficult for an editor
to notice and prevent.9 9 The false light actual malice require-
ment, however, is meant to address this concern. Negligent re-
porters and editors who merely fail to observe an error or to use
reasonable care in averting misrepresentations will be pro-
tected. There can only be liability if a plaintiff can show that
the publication knew of the falsity or acted with reckless disre-
gard for the truth.
In addition, false light claims do not endanger any funda-
mental values of free speech. The Supreme Court has declared
that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact." °° "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error ma-
97. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
98. As another commentator puts it, "[olne look at the chilling effect on
free speech being suffered today by tabloids makes one ponder what types of
stories the readers are being denied by the writers' fear of a false light suit."
Bryan R. Lasswell, Note, In Defense of False Light: Why False Light Must Re-
main a Viable Cause ofAction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 174 (1993).
99. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) ("We create a grave
risk of serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press in a free
society if we saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a cer-
tainty the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, picture or
portrait, particularly as related to nondefamatory matter."); see also Zuckman,
supra note 39, at 257 (arguing that defamatory injury to reputation provides a
red flag to editors regarding legal risks of publication, whereas false light
sometimes carries no advance notice of risk because the misrepresentation can
be laudatory).
100. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); see also Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1987) ("False statements of fact are
particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
market place of ideas.... "); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979)
("Spreading false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment cre-
dentials."). Of course, a plaintiff could be subjected to false light publicity
without the use of speech, but speech is the main source of harm, and the




terially advances society's interest in 'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' debate on public issues." 101 Indeed, false statements
can actually thwart constitutional interests because the self-
government purposes of the First Amendment'0 2 are frustrated
by misinformed citizens. Courts that eliminate false light pro-
tect only constitutionally disapproved intentional and reckless
misrepresentations.
2. False Light Claims Do Not Threaten the Press and Can
Promote First Amendment Values
Even if imposing liability for intentional or reckless but
non-defamatory misrepresentations had a chilling effect on free
speech, this burden would primarily affect the press-a very
powerful entity. The widespread publicity requirement of the
false light tort targets the mass media because non-media de-
fendants rarely disseminate information "to the public at large,
or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."10 3
Indeed, the privacy tort was expressly created to curb abuses
by the press. 1°4 "Newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting
companies are businesses conducted for profit and often make
very large ones. Like other enterprises that inflict damage in
the course of performing a service... they must pay the
freight....-"1o 5 Given the media's vast resources and influence,
it is unlikely to "catch a chill" from privacy protections. Be-
cause only misrepresentations made with actual malice are
likely to be silenced, 10 6 there is little chance that false light will
101. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
102. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (de-
claring that the First Amendment safeguard of free expression "was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people," and that "free political discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people.., is a
fundamental principle of our constitutional system" (citations omitted)).
103. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 652E cmt. a (cross-referencing § 652D
cmt. a); see Zimmerman, supra note 21, at 300.
104. See Franklin, supra note 70, at 424; see also supra notes 17-23 and ac-
companying text.
105. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967).
106. The North Carolina Supreme Court discounted entirely the existence
of such misrepresentations. In rejecting the false light tort, it opined that un-
like the press of Warren and Brandeis's day, "journalists simply are more re-
sponsible and professional today." Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co.,
312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984); see generally supra text accompanying notes
54-59. If the court is correct, a lively imagination is needed to conceive of the
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curtail the willingness or ability of the press to make informa-
tion available to the public, even with a rise in litigation. 107
It may be difficult to compare and balance the competing
interests in free speech and privacy because the measure of
harm from an invasion of privacy differs qualitatively with the
measure of harm from a restraint on the media. In trying to
balance these interests, courts should consider that both the
right to privacy and the right to a free flow of information are
ultimately for the sake of the public. Courts therefore ought to
bear in mind that "allowing the media to engage in tortious be-
havior imposes costs upon the public whose interests the media
is claimed to serve. Forcing the public, ostensibly in its own in-
terest, to subsidize newsgathering behavior is not a decision to
be undertaken lightly."08
The false light tort may even promote freedom of speech. 0 9
One scholar argues that the press, far from being silenced by
tort liability for invasion of privacy, actually itself inhibits pub-
lic debate by exposing speakers or their families to public scru-
tiny that is often uncomfortable and embarrassing." 0 Under
this view, a cause of action for false light would actually pro-
staggering sensationalism and scandal that must have daily overwhelmed the
nineteenth-century public.
107. It is true that lawsuits against the press are becoming more common,
but this could be as much a result of the increasing intrusiveness of the media
as the general litigiousness of our society and the availability of multiple
causes of action for torts committed by journalists. See SANFORD, supra note
79, at 1 (noting the rise in libel lawsuits in the past 25 years). Lawsuits
against the media reflect the "uneasiness, even anger that the public feels to-
ward the expanded role that the communications media have assumed in or-
dering our lives and defining the public agenda. [Such lawsuits serve] as a
soapbox... for diatribes about the unaccountability and unfairness of the
press." Id. False light actions, however, are less dangerous to the press than
defamation actions. See id. at 523 ("[Plrivacy issues... certainly do not even
approach, numerically or qualitatively, the threat [to the press] posed by libel
lawsuits."). It is therefore difficult to see any significant danger in retaining
false light.
108. Mark Weidemaier, Note, Balancing, Press Immunity, and the Com-
patibility of Tort Law with the First Amendment, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1695, 1717
(1998).
109. See, e.g., Suzanne Reynolds Greenwood, Comment, Privacy: The
Search for a Standard, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 659, 689 (1975) ("'Any society
sincerely interested in protecting the right of privacy is hardly likely to be at
the same time hostile to the right of free expression. Both interests tend to
have the same friends and the same enemies.') (quoting Thomas I. Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 928
(1963)).
110. See Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71
WASH. L. REV. 683, 713 (1996).
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mote freedom of speech by encouraging the expression of ideas
and participation in public affairs, with less fear of media dis-
tortion and public embarrassment.' 1
In addition, the many legal scholars who champion free-
dom of the press generally focus on the indispensable nature of
a free press in a democratic society, but do not consider how
public confidence in the press is diminished by irresponsible,
unfair, or sensational reporting. Because media credibility is
impaired when journalists violate respected private interests
without facing legal consequences, journalists are less able to
serve important social or political roles. Subscriptions and
ratings manifestly do not decline in such situations, but the
media might be taken less seriously as an ally of the public.
The tort of false light should be preserved, if for no other reason
than to stand as an example of what our society considers un-
acceptable conduct by the media.
B. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FALSE LIGHT, DEFAMATION AND
THE OTHER PRIVACY TORTS
False light is a distinct cause of action. Defamation and
false light, though frequently compared, have different ele-
ments and protect different interests.112 As previously noted,113
a prima facie cause of action for defamation exists under the
Restatement when there has been: (1) a false and defamatory
statement; (2) concerning the plaintiff; (3) published to a third
person; (4) with fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (5)
which causes special harm when required." 4 A "defamatory
statement" is one that "tends so to harm the reputation of an-
other as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him."115
False light, on the other hand, does not require a defamatory
statement. It requires intentional or reckless disclosure to the
public at large of statements or facts that are false and highly
offensive" 6 and is meant to safeguard an individual's privacy
rather than reputation.
111. See id.
112. See supra notes 11-12 (setting out the differing elements of the two
torts); infra Part II.C (discussing the unique interest protected by false light).
113. See supra note 12 (quoting the Restatement's definition of defama-
tion).
114. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 558.
115. Id. § 559.
116. See id. § 652E.
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Several points of difference between the two torts must be
emphasized. First, the disclosure requirements are distinct.
False light requires "publicity," meaning communication to the
public at large. 1 7 On the other hand, defamation requires only
"publication," meaning the defamatory statement must be
communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff." 8
False light plaintiffs thus bear a heavier burden when proving
disclosure. Second, a libelous or slanderous statement must be
"defamatory," lowering the community's opinion of the plaintiff
and deterring others from associating with him.119 False light,
by contrast, requires the statement to be "highly offensive," a
subjective standard that in practice may be more or less diffi-
cult to establish. 20 This is a crucial difference. Because false
light requires no damage to reputation, a plaintiff can be cast
in a false light that reflects positively or even improves reputa-
tion. For example, a veteran might be depicted as a "war hero"
and given praise or recognition for deeds he did not perform. 121
Such a misrepresentation might be just as offensive as one that
disparages, but false light is the only tort that provides a rem-
edy. Finally, the standard of fault differs for defamation and
false light. Defamation generally requires at least a showing of
negligence by plaintiffs, 122 whereas false light carries the more
demanding requirement of actual malice. 123
117. Compare id. § 652E cmt. a (cross-referencing § 652D cmt. a) (defining
publicity as communication "to the public at large, or to so many persons that
the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
knowledge"), with supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating the elements
of defamation under § 558).
118. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Big B, Inc., 460 So. 2d 1286, 1287 (Ala. 1984)
(noting that publication occurs if the statement is made to one or more third
parties); see also Bloustein, supra note 19, at 981 (pointing out that while a
single publication is sufficient to defame, because reputation can be damaged
in the mind of only one person, invasion of privacy is founded on insult to indi-
viduality, which requires a disclosure to the public). This suggests that the
two torts protect separate interests. See infra note 127 (quoting Bloustein at
greater length); supra Part I.C (reviewing attempts to define the interests pro-
tected by the false light tort).
119. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
120. See Lasswell, supra note 98, at 175.
121. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 894-96 & nn.50-61 (describing numer-
ous situations taken from case law in which false light claims were based on
non-disparaging statements).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 43-53. At common law, before the
U.S. Supreme Court began "tinkering" with defamation, it carried strict li-
ability. See Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 771 P.2d 406, 414 (Cal. 1989).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 43-53.
20001
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In addition to differing elements, truth is a common-law
defense to defamation but not to false light, though most courts
require a false light plaintiff to show the defendant's statement
was false. 124 Again, false light plaintiffs therefore bear the
heavier burden because they must make an affirmative show-
ing of falsity rather than leaving it to defendants to justify the
offensive statement.
As for other forms of invasion of privacy, there is little
overlap with false light. 125 Intrusion upon seclusion generally
involves some kind of physical intrusion, such as prying eyes.
Publication of private facts involves the publicizing of true in-
formation, such as personal medical records. Appropriation of
name or likeness usually involves exploiting the name or image
of a well-known person for profit without permission. Although
situations may arise in which false light and another privacy
violation occur (such as a false report of observations obtained
by spying on another person in a private place), this is not
overlap but rather a multiple offense. If a Minnesota resident
has the misfortune to be cast in a false light before the public
eye without an additional and separate violation of privacy,
Minnesota courts leave that resident without recourse.
False light is meant to protect a distinct interest as well. 126
Defamation protects a plaintiffs interest in reputation and a
good name, whereas false light protects inward interests that
have been characterized in a variety of ways.1 27 Even the com-
124. See Cordell v. Detective Publications, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1212, 1220
(E.D. Tenn. 1968) (concluding "reasonably factual" statements cannot place
individuals in a false light); Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Iowa
1977) (determining that there is no cause of action for false light unless the
defendant's statements are "materially and substantially false"). But see Lar-
sen v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1189 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (holding that the element of falsity can be satisfied if a defendant cre-
ates a substantially false impression by juxtaposing true facts); Moore v. Sun
Publ'g Corp., 881 P.2d 735, 744 (N.M. App. 1994). By contrast, defamation
plaintiffs at common law do not have the burden of proving that the defen-
dant's statement was false, as long as the plaintiff is not a public figure or offi-
cial. The plaintiff must simply allege falsity, which is presumed unless the
defendant raises truth as an affirmative defense. See Melaleuca, Inc. v. Clark,
78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 637 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, §
623A cmt. g); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 581A cmt. b.
125. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (providing examples of inva-
sions of privacy other than false light and noting rationales for the corre-
sponding causes of action).
126. For a brief discussion of interests protected by the other privacy torts,
see supra note 8.
127. See supra Part I.C. Bloustein, for example, cites the publicity re-
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peting interests opposed to defamation and false light differ.
The right of public discussion conflicts with the reputation in-
terest protected by defamation, whereas it is the public's right
to information, which conflicts with the right to privacy.128 The
scope of free expression tends to be narrowed more by restric-
tions on defaming others, whereas the availability of informa-
tion is limited more by excluding certain private matters from
the realm of public knowledge.
If Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is part of a growing trend,
it may be that the future of the false light tort depends on a
convincing articulation of its purpose. Yet the interest it pro-
tects is poorly understood. The remainder of this Note will
therefore attempt to discover this interest and give a clear ac-
count of it.
C. INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE FALSE LIGHT TORT
The right of individuals not to be subjected to public scru-
tiny resulting from inaccurate and offensive publicity is a valu-
able interest worth protecting. Despite good reasons for the
confusion surrounding false light,129 the lack of consensus
about the purpose of the tort is puzzling. After all, most people
would agree that it is bad to be unwillingly exposed to the pub-
lic in an inaccurate and offensive way. We should therefore
also be able to agree about why this is bad, what interest it
would violate, and about the social value of providing legal pro-
tection to that interest. Courts and scholars, however, have
failed to arrive at a satisfactory account of exactly what false
light protects. In the discussion that follows, this Note will ex-
amine why attempts by legal scholars to analyze the privacy
right at stake under false light have failed and will propose
that the tort protects an individual's interest in self-
determination.
quirement of the privacy torts as evidence that a different interest is pro-
tected:
The right to sue for defamation has ancient origins because reputa-
tion could be put in peril by simple word of mouth or turn of the pen.
The right to privacy in the form we know it, however, had to await the
advent of the urbanization of our way of life including, as an instance,
the institutionalization of mass publicity, because only then was a
significant and everyday threat to personal dignity and individuality
realized.
Bloustein, supra note 19, at 984.
128. See Greenwood, supra note 109, at 670.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
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1. Previous Attempts To Define the Interest False Light Pro-
tects Have Been Inadequate
Many legal thinkers have tried to interpret the interests
underlying the right to privacy, but the interest protected by
false light remains largely unexplored aside from laconic
treatments in the course of broader discussions. Warren and
Brandeis clearly believed that the "right to privacy" was a suf-
ficient description of the interests protected by the new tort
they proposed, but courts and scholars evidently need more.130
Courts have provided a variety ofjustifications for false light,' 31
but these attempts have tended to be cursory or flat. A handful
of scholars have tried to expand on the interests at stake with
the right to privacy, but for the most part these accounts do not
address false light and are unsatisfactory for a variety of rea-
sons.
Bloustein made the most notable effort by arguing that the
true interest protected by the right to privacy generally is hu-
man dignity, and that while the interest protected by false light
includes reputation (as Prosser asserted), it really protects in-
dividual integrity from violation. 132 Bloustein argues that the
law already protects individuality from interference in various
forms, including assault, battery, false imprisonment and the
like. 133 Invasion of privacy merely redresses interference of a
non-physical kind when "techniques of publicity [are used] to
make a public spectacle of an otherwise private life."1 34 Such
an interference is no less important when the information pub-
licized about the individual is false. Privacy interests are thus
distinct from those protected by defamation law because a vic-
tim of defamation is robbed of his reputation, whereas one
whose privacy is invaded has lost his individuality and dig-
130. See Bloustein, supra note 19, at 970.
131. See supra text accompanying note 72.
132. See Bloustein, supra note 19, at 991, 1003.
133. See id. at 1002-03.
134. Id. at 1003. Bloustein writes:
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among
others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratification is
subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and
human dignity. Such an individual merges with the mass.... Such a
being, although sentient, is fungible; he is not an individual.
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nity. 135 "The damage is to an individual's self-respect in being
made a public spectacle."136
"Human dignity," however, fails to support false light suffi-
ciently. The phrase may be compelling, but it is too indefinite
to create a consensus among legal thinkers as to why this in-
terest requires further protection from the law in the form of a
privacy tort. As Bloustein notes, established torts already pro-
tect individuals from other affronts to human dignity.137 False
light cases comprise too small a percentage of the "dignitary"
torts to merit a separate cause of action without some unique
interest at stake. If false light invasion of privacy violates hu-
man dignity, this does not necessarily mean that the law
should provide a remedy. Indeed, the law fails to protect indi-
viduals from many violations of human dignity. 138 Bloustein's
attempts to expand on the concept of "human dignity" by using
such terms as "individual[] independence" or "integrity,"139
"man's essence as a unique and self-determining being,"140 or
"self-respect,"141 are no more sharply focused than the concept
itself. Like "human dignity," these phrases are likely to have
varying meanings to different people, who may or may not find
them convincing. Bloustein maintains that this is inescapable
when we attempt to identify and describe basic human values,
which are "necessarily vague and ill-defined." 142 Nonetheless, a
legal justification requires readily comprehensible concepts
that invite assent, 143 especially when a new cause of action
must be defended without the benefits of strong tradition or
precedent.
Other writers have taken issue with Bloustein's view as
well. Professor Ruth Gavison contends that Bloustein and
other scholars merely attempted to analyze privacy in terms of
some underlying "real" interest, when in fact privacy itself is a
135. See id. at 981.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
138. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 897.
139. Bloustein, supra note 19, at 971.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 981.
142. Id. at 1001 ("Compounded of profound human hopes and longings on
the one side and elusive aspects of human psychology and experience on the
other, our social goals are more fit to be pronounced by prophets and poets
than by professors.").
143. On the importance of consensus regarding interests protected by tort
law, see supra note 86.
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distinct and coherent concept that is useful only when recog-
nized as such.'"4 Gavison states:
Our interest in privacy, I argue, is related to our concern over our ac-
cessibility to others: the extent to which we are known to others, the
extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to
which we are the subject of others' attention. This concept of privacy
as a concern for limited accessibility enables us to identify when
losses of privacy occur. Furthermore, the reasons for which we claim
privacy in different situations are similar. They are related to the
functions privacy has in our lives: the promotion of liberty, autonomy,
selflood, and human relations, and furthering the existence of a free
society.'
45
Gavison's concern is that because privacy is seldom protected in
the absence of some other interest, we might conclude that it is
not an important value. She therefore calls for an affirmative
and explicit commitment to privacy.146
Gavison's central point, that "privacy" itself is a distinct
and coherent concept which should not be reduced to any un-
derlying "real" interest, is well taken. Yet she describes the
concept "privacy" in terms sounding very much like underlying
interests, such as "our concern over accessibility to others," "the
extent to which we are the subject of others' attention," "auton-
omy," "selfhood," and more. 147  Although she qualifies these
characterizations by saying only that they "relate" to our con-
cept of privacy, or are "functions" of privacy,148 she does not ac-
tually explicate the concept itself. Scholars who have at-
tempted to explain the concept engage in "[rieductionist
analyses," she argues. 149 Yet her "concept of privacy as a con-
cern for limited accessibility"150 is difficult to distinguish from
the "reductionist" theses she attacks. It is undoubtedly true
that privacy is an important concept deserving recognition in
its own right, if only to avoid a perception that privacy interests
are trivial or really comprised of other interests already pro-
144. See Gavison, supra note 88, at 422.
145. Id. at 423.
146. See id. at 424.
147. Id. at 423.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Gavison is at pains to point out that this concept only shows the
contribution of privacy to other goals and that therefore her logic is not merely
another form of reductionism. See id. at n.11. This virtually makes privacy
inaccessible to any kind of explanation at all, however, because the same can
be said of any statement explicating the concept of privacy. Any purported ex-
planation of privacy would then either be "reductionism" or not be any expla-
nation at all.
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tected by law. Nevertheless, "autonomous control over our ac-
cessibility to others" is no more a sharply defined concept for
legal purposes than the suggestions made by Bloustein, which
Gavison attacks.
Unlike Gavison and Bloustein, Professor Gary T. Schwartz
deals specifically with the interest protected by the false light
tort, briefly proposing an interest somewhat akin to the reputa-
tion interest first advanced by Prosser. According to Schwartz,
when an individual is placed in a false light before the public,
his identity in society is confounded or impugned because con-
veying seemingly essential information about him brings about
an offensive or disorienting mismatch between his actual iden-
tity and his identity in the minds of others.1 51 This can be said
to affect "reputation," 52 and implicates privacy concerns be-
cause the information will often relate to very private portions
of the individual's life.' 53
Schwartz's treatment of the interest protected by false
light is short and unsatisfactory. He concludes that states
should retain a false light cause of action in a form even more
restricted than currently exists. 54 As already discussed, repu-
tation is not a privacy interest,155 and the same objections that
can be made about Prosser's view apply with equal force to this
argument. Expanding on "reputation" to include such impon-
derables as a "conflict between the plaintiffs actual identity
and his identity in the minds of others"156 only raises again the
problems of vagueness and subjectivity inherent in suggestions
from other scholars. Schwartz's only argument addressing why
this reputation interest implicates privacy is that "false light
statements often relate to very private portions of the subject's
life."157 This is merely an incidental connection to privacy,
however, and leaves open to dispute the assertion that false
light protects any privacy interest at all. Moreover, reputation
is already protected under defamation law.
151. See Schwartz, supra note 88, at 897-98.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 898.
154. Schwartz argues that when a defamatory statement is the subject of a
false light claim, this only renders defamation litigation more complex and ex-
pensive, making false light "little more than an administrative annoyance."
Id. at 892. Eliminating the false light claim in these situations, however, pre-
cludes recovery for any injury other than to reputation.
155. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.




None of these efforts at uncovering or explicating the in-
terests at stake in a right to privacy deals at length, if at all,
with the specific interest protected by the false light tort.158
The legal system needs a clear account of the privacy interest
at stake specifically in false light claims. This account should
be consistent with the various interests courts have actually
identified, should not depend on nebulous or subjective con-
cepts, and an ordinary person should be able to recognize the
interest as important and worth protecting. Such a foundation
for the false light tort is necessary to safeguard its uncertain
future against further judicial contraction in the aftermath of
Lake. In the remainder of this discussion, a distinct false light
interest will be proposed and supported, first by considering is-
sues of public policy and next by justifying the interest inde-
pendently.
2. The False Light Tort Serves Public Interests and Protects
Self-Determination
This Note proposes that the interest protected by the false
light tort is self-determination, a privacy interest. This Note
will make no attempt to define "privacy," however, because
many aspects of human life contribute to the meaning of this
concept, including social, psychological, philosophical, linguistic
and legal. 159 Indeed, "privacy" may be the name of numerous
concepts without a central, reducible meaning. 6 0 The idea of
privacy is evolving as well. Shifting societal values and
changing contexts in which we use the idea may render today's
accurate definition obsolete in the future. 161 In the next one
158. Gavison does at least raise the question, "Does dissemination of false
information about X mean that he has lost privacy?" Gavison, supra note 88,
at 431. She concludes that there has been a loss of privacy in that case, be-
cause others believe they know more about him, resulting in a loss of ano-
nymity to that person, who has become the subject of other people's attention.
See id. at 431-32. Her reasoning applies whether or not the information was
true or false, however.
159. For a useful survey of sociological, psychological and anthropological
studies attempting to clarify the concept of privacy, see Dennis J. Trooien,
Note, Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model, 4 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 163, 170-75 (1978) (applying multidisciplinary studies of privacy to a
proposal for an alternative legal definition of the concept).
160. See generally Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many?, in
PRIVACY, supra note 19, at 182.
161. See Gormley, supra note 21, at 1340-41. Gormley writes:
[The meaning of privacy] is heavily driven by the events of history.
What constitutes an engine of privacy in the year 1890, is not neces-
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hundred years, we will want privacy law to protect us from
harms different than those that concern us today.162 Self-
determination might be one of many possible "privacy" concepts
or it might underlie them all, but no attempt will be made to
"prove" this one way or the other. Instead of philosophizing
about the ultimate meaning of privacy, this Note will simply
argue that the false light tort serves the public interest in sev-
eral ways and then justify the proposed interest protected by
the tort on its own terms.
a. Policy Considerations Support the Existence of a False Light
Tort
The false light tort serves important public interests. To
start with the most general point, our political system places a
premium on the individual. Any dignitary harm that a public-
ity mechanism inflicts on an individual has consequences for a
system requiring social interaction and public debate. The
democratic exchange of ideas suffers when people fail to par-
ticipate in public discussion due to fears of embarrassing or of-
fensive publicity. This is especially true when the harm affects
how the individual views himself in the community, as with
unwanted publicity placing him in a false light. Technology
and urbanization had begun to introduce this threat in Warren
and Brandeis's time, and privacy came into being, as one
author puts it, "to keep American democracy in step with its
own inventiveness." 163 Technology has continued to produce
means of obtaining and broadcasting information about indi-
viduals that Warren and Brandeis could not have imagined. "It
seems fair to say that if [they] had not invented a right of pri-
sarily the same thing which formulates a societal notion of privacy in
the United States in 1939, or 1968 or 1973....
... [Ilt is impossible to predict with any precision new permuta-
tions of this right, any more than one can predict the events of Ameri-
can history itself.
Id.
162. See id. at 1342.
163. Id. at 1353. Gormley interprets Warren and Brandeis's article to say
that the undermining of individuality threatens a civilized society, without
which democracy is weakened. See id. at 1352-53. Privacy protects "institu-
tions and freedoms which lie at the core of American democracy... [including]
family, work, religious expression, home life, contemplative thought, citizen-
ship and community." Id. at 1434. An unsympathetic commentator makes the
interesting acknowledgment that "a major tactic for the dictator is to subju-
gate by eliminating privacy." Kalven, supra note 19, at 326. See generally
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949); EDvARD RADZINSKY, STALIN (1996).
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vacy [in 1890], somebody else would have had to invent a simi-
lar legal concept, by whatever name, in short order."164
On a more subjective level, privacy promotes the independ-
ent and critical thinking needed to make informed decisions re-
garding elections and government policies. When an individual
is placed in a false light before the public, the ability to make
informed choices is diminished because unwanted publicity
forces the individual into seclusion and thwarts the free ex-
change of ideas. "[Wihen a person's privacy is invaded, he is
discouraged from making free choices.... [He is] more reluc-
tant to take part in self-governing, decision-making processes
and the purpose of the first amendment has been frustrated."165
Empirical studies have been interpreted to support this.166 The
availability of a false light tort can prevent ridicule and pres-
sure to conform, indirectly serving the needs of public debate.
Enforcing the false light tort will also enhance society's
ability to attract gifted individuals to public service. One often
hears complaints about undistinguished presidential candi-
dates, but it is hard to blame talented people for considering
164. Gormley, supra note 21, at 1353. But see Kalven, supra note 19, at
329 ("[Tlhere is a curious nineteenth century quaintness about the grievance,
an air of injured gentility... One may perhaps wonder if the tort is not an
anachronism, a nineteenth century response to the mass press which is hardly
in keeping with the more robust tastes or mores of today.") Tastes today may
be more robust, but so is the technology of surveillance, instant publicity, data
collection, and so on. Hardly antiquated, the privacy torts are closely con-
nected to contemporary social issues, leading Gormley to describe privacy as
the defining issue of the 1990s. See Gormley, supra note 21, at 1342 ("Abor-
tion issues, the right-to-die, drug testing in the workplace, AIDS, homosexu-
ality, drunk-driving roadblocks, all of these issues central to our society in-
volve, at least in part, an investigation of the legal concept of privacy.").
165. Greenwood, supra note 109, at 688.
166. See Scott, supra note 110, at 717 (citing studies that indicate adverse
publicity not only reduces the likelihood that an individual will express dis-
senting views, but even curtails the willingness to hold such views privately).
The author argues that:
[P]rivacy encourages [participation in a democratic, pluralistic soci-
ety], and enhances its quality, by allowing individuals the space
within which to formulate their individual thoughts and opinions....
We are committed to a society that encourages pluralism and inde-
pendent judgment. We expect individuals to bring those independentjudgments to bear in the political arena. Thus, privacy is necessary to
actualize our vision of ourselves as a nation.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Gavison, supra note 88, at 449 (noting that
"[alutonomy is another value that is linked to the function of privacy in pro-
moting liberty. Moral autonomy is the reflective and critical acceptance of so-
cial norms, with obedience based on an independent moral evaluation of their
worth").
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the media "spotlight" so disagreeable as to outweigh even a de-
sire for the highest office in the land. 67 Although false light
cannot solve this problem, judicial recognition of the tort will at
least articulate society's commitment to respecting the privacy
of individuals who wish to serve the public.
b. The False Light Tort Protects an Individual's Interest in
Self-Determination
No doubt each of the interests claimed to be protected by
the right to privacy, and the false light tort in particular, is to
some extent valid.1 68 There is, however, a more basic personal
interest common to all of these interests which is jeopardized
when individuals are subjected to unwanted publicity placing
them in a false light. This interest is self-determination, a con-
crete principle that is more clear and accessible than others
proposed, and which underlies each of the other interests in the
context of false light privacy.
Self-determination simply means allowing individuals to
regulate their own affairs, a kind of privacy. Placing someone
in a highly offensive false light before the public eye interferes
with self-determination because the misrepresentation defines
that person for the public and limits his ability to choose how to
interact with others. Whereas a defamatory falsehood harms
reputation and may change the way others treat the individual,
the false light misrepresentation changes the way the individ-
ual deals with others. As courts repeatedly emphasize, the in-
jury from an invasion of privacy is to the victim's feelings.169
167. See Gavison, supra note 88, at 456. Gavison states that "[plersons in-
terested in government service must consider the loss of virtually all claims
and expectations of privacy in calculating the costs of running for public office.
Respect for privacy might reduce these costs." Id.
168. As previously noted, these have included human dignity, control over
accessibility to others, freedom from scorn, ridicule, embarrassment, humilia-
tion, harassment, personal outrage, injury to feelings, mental anguish, or con-
tempt and disgrace, and the right to be let alone. See supra text accompany-
ing note 72; supra Part II.C.1.
169. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384-85 n.9 (1967) ("In the
'right of privacy' cases the primary damage is the mental distress from having
been exposed to public view.. . ."); Reed v. Real Detective Publ'g Co., 162 P.2d
133, 139 (Ariz. 1945) ("[Under the law, recovery may be had for an invasion of
the right of privacy for injured feelings alone ... ."); Froelich v. Adair, 516
P.2d 993, 996 (Kan. 1973) ("[Invasion of privacy] is a cause of action based
upon injury to plaintiffs emotions and his mental suffering...."); Sullivan v.
Pulitzer Broad. Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Mo. 1986) ("[T]he interest affected is
the subjective one of injury to [the] inner person.") (citation omitted); Brink v.
Griffith, 396 P.2d 793, 796 (Wash. 1964) ("[An invasion of privacy action is
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An individual who is forced to confront an offensive and mis-
leading image of himself broadcast to the world is put in a role
that carries different and inferior options for interacting with
others. The reason is not damage to reputation, but self-
imposed withdrawal or defensiveness arising from feelings of
humiliation, indignity, helplessness, resentment, nakedness,
and the like. The false light tort does not protect against mere
hurt feelings, however, but against the natural consequences of
these inner reactions in the specific setting of the public arena.
The natural response to offensive false light publicity is with-
drawal or defensiveness, and when someone impairs an indi-
vidual's involvement with public life and freedom of decision-
making, the law should provide a remedy.
The interest in self-determination can be seen as a common
component in other interests proposed for justifying false
light. 170 For example, "human dignity" is in large measure an
expression of what is unique about a human being among other
creatures and relates to our capacity for voluntary, conscious
action. "Control over accessibility to others" is only one very
specific form of self-determination. The various interests in
mental tranquility likewise are connected to self-determination
because an offensive disruption to mental tranquility, imposed
from without, diminishes the ability to make reasoned, reflec-
tive choices. By recognizing this common element in all the in-
terests purporting to underlie the false light tort, courts can
protect a legitimate need, maintain consistency with estab-
lished rationales, and avoid the insecurity of having to defend
an ill-defined or insubstantial interest. Moreover, self-
determination is not merely another "real" interest supposedly
underlying the interest in privacy. Self-determination itself is
by definition a kind of privacy.
Of course, other dignitary or physical violations besides
false light can interfere with the interest in self-determination.
A particular tort theory need not be the exclusive protection for
a personal interest to be justified, however. 17 It must simply
primarily concerned with compensation for injured feelings or mental suffer-
ing") (citing Themo v. New England Newspaper Publ'g Co., 27 N.E.2d 753
(Mass. 1940)).
170. See supra note 168.
171. For example, mental anguish damages are available in suits for medi-
cal malpractice, some violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and per-
sonal injury, not to mention intentional infliction of emotional distress. See
Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577, 587 (Tex. 1994) (Hightower, J., dis-
senting).
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protect a clearly identifiable interest in a situation where there
is no other protection. As already noted, there are numerous
potential situations in which a false light invasion of privacy is
not deterred or remedied by defamation or other torts.172 Con-
versely, every interference with self-determination need not be
protected for self-determination to warrant protection from
false light publicity. Sometimes the law provides no recourse
for an offensive act. The special situation in which offensive
publicity misrepresents an individual to the public is, however,
an important situation needing redress in the courts because
public policy implications exist.173
Self-determination is not a new, undiscovered interest, but
rather one that has already been acknowledged by scholars and
courts. 174 Unlike other proposals, it is less encumbered by
philosophical baggage and more calculated to achieve a consen-
sus. While related to respected but indistinct concepts like
"autonomy," "integrity," or "dignity," self-determination is a
familiar concept with a narrow, literal meaning, and can be
readily acknowledged as a vital interest. It is an interest al-
ready recognized implicitly in other areas of the law, such as
First Amendment jurisprudence and fundamental-decision
cases under the Fourteenth Amendment. 175 Because self-
172. See supra note 121 and accompanying text; see also supra note 15 and
accompanying text (providing an example of a situation where no other torts
would apply). See generally Part II.B (distinguishing defamation ind other
forms of invasion of privacy).
173. See Part H.C.2.a.
174. For example, as tho California Supreme Court stated in a well-known
case involving publication of private facts:
[people] fear exposure not only to those closest to them; much of the
outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy is a reaction to expo-
sure to persons known only through business or other secondary rela-
tionships. The claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is of the
right to define one's circle of intimacy-to choose who shall see be-
neath the quotidian mask. Loss of control over which "face" one puts
on may result in a literal loss of self-identity, and is humiliating be-
neath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an
object.
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (en banc) (cita-
tions omitted).
175. For a First Amendment example, see Stanley v. Georgia stating that:[ilf the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has
no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books
he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to con-
trol men's minds.
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). For Fourteenth Amendment examples, consider Roe
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determination relates to many of the themes found throughout
the American legal and political systems, we have a legitimate
expectation that the law will respect this interest. It deserves
protection from offensive false light publicity no less than from
other intrusions on privacy.
The plaintiffs described in the introduction to this Note,
with a few additional examples, will help to illustrate the self-
determination interest protected by the false light tort. The
amusement park entertainer whose picture was published in a
pornographic magazine had recourse for her injuries because
the tort was available to provide a remedy for offensive public-
ity representing one's livelihood in a salacious and inaccurate
manner.1 76 The humiliation and outrage that an individual can
be expected to experience in such a position could have signifi-
cantly influenced her behavior, for example, by causing her to
restrict her encounters with others. Her ability to make pri-
vate decisions without the undue effects of offensive and false
publicity was sharply curtailed.
Much the same can be said for a former newspaper pub-
lisher whose successors allegedly blamed his incompetence, in a
letter to subscribers, for a decline in business. 177 It is not diffi-
cult to imagine how an interest in self-determination might be
v. Wade, Loving v. Virginia and Griswold v. Connecticut. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty... [or] in the Ninth Amend-
ment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute re-
stricting inter-racial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (concluding that a fundamental right of privacy implicit in the Consti-
tution was broad enough to protect decisions made by married couples in their
own bedrooms).
176. See Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 258 (5th Cir. 1984); supra text ac-
companying notes 13-14.
177. See Moore v. Sun Publ'g Co., 881 P.2d 735 (N.M. 1994). While work-
ing for the newspaper, the plaintiff attempted to increase revenues by charg-
ing an unpopular fee for affidavits of publication for legal notices, a service
previously conducted free of charge. See id. at 737. The owners fired him and
mailed letters to every attorney in the county in an attempt to regain lost
business. See id. The letters explained the former publisher's actions in a
way that made him look incompetent, but cited only facts that were techni-
cally true, defeating his defamation claim in the absence of "provably false fac-
tual assertions." Id. at 742. The court decided that as a matter of law the
plaintiff did not state a claim for defamation, but because the letters permitted
inferences about his judgment and management abilities that he claimed were
not legitimate, it remanded the case so his false light claim could be tried. See
id. at 743-44.
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undermined in the professional setting by public statements
that force an individual to suspect his own ineptitude. Like-
wise, an elderly newspaper carrier falsely portrayed as having
gotten pregnant by a wealthy client on her route 178 might have
felt that her options for interacting with her community were
severely limited because of that publicity.
Moreover, undeserved positive or neutral portrayals might
inflict a reputational injury not addressed by defamation in ad-
dition to violating the interest in self-determination. The ath-
lete credited with wartime heroics that he never performed 179
might be forced to endure the enmity of his comrades, the em-
barrassment of having to admit details of his undistinguished
service, and self-imposed withdrawal from feelings of guilt or
shame. Similarly, a noted musician impersonated for a televi-
sion broadcast' 80 may not have been defamed, but the misrep-
resentation could have mislead the public about his artistry or
competence at interpreting music. The impersonation thereby
violated his interest in self-determination by publicly injuring
his self-respect and interfering with his ability to define him-
self. As with each of the other plaintiffs, the false light tort al-
lowed him to exercise a legitimate right to be shown to the
public as he is.
In light of the above discussion, a few criticisms of false
light should be addressed. The first concerns a supposed incon-
178. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065
(8th Cir. 1992). A tabloid had published a photograph of an elderly local leg-
end in Arkansas who delivered newspapers for more than fifty years alongside
a story about a 101-year-old "granny" forced to quit when a millionaire sub-
scriber got her pregnant. See id. at 1067. While the court allowed the jury to
consider a defamation claim, the jury did not find the story to be defamatory
but found for the woman's estate on her false light claim. See id. False light
may best address certain kinds of injury even when other causes of action are
available.
179. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840, 842-43, 843 n.*
(N.Y. 1967); supra text accompanying note 15.
180. See Kitt v. Pathmakers, Inc., 672 A.2d 76 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996). The
principal clarinetist for the National Symphony Orchestra was impersonated
by an actor during a Fourth of July concert on the National Mall, because the
concert promoter wanted television viewers to think he was performing on the
west porch of the Capitol. See id. at 78. The court remanded the case, see id.
at 80, but the defendants successfully moved for summary judgment. See Kitt
v. Capital Concerts, Inc., No. 97-CV-780, 1999 WL 604088, at *1 (D.C. Ct. App.
Aug. 5, 1999). In reviewing the latter decision, the court noted that the imper-
sonation was not understood to be "of and concerning" the clarinetist, because
the actor did not resemble him. Id. at *3. Also, the performance failed to rise
to the level of being "highly offensive." Id.
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sistency between a false statement or impression and the con-
cept of privacy. According to this view, one cannot intend to
keep private something that is false.' 8 l This view assumes that
the basis of the tort is the publicizing of information, when in
fact it is an offensive false impression and harm to inward in-
terests. The privacy surrounds the emotions and decisions of
the aggrieved person; the falsity is merely the means by which
privacy is violated in particular situations. 18 2
A second criticism is supplied by Professor Kelso's powerful
attack on the false light tort, relied upon by the Lake court in
asserting that "a case has rarely succeeded squarely on a false
light claim."183 Kelso's article purported to find only two "true"
decisions nationwide that stood for a successful false light inva-
sion of privacy claim prior to 1992.184 This assessment is mis-
leading, however, because Kelso limited his search to appellate
decisions in state courts that affirmed damage awards on the
basis of false light in the absence of other causes of action. 8 5
He excluded federal cases using state law, unappealed victories
for false light plaintiffs, successes on multiple theories, and
claims that survive summary judgment but settle before trial.
This is a highly restrictive class of cases. It is no wonder there
would be few examples fitting Kelso's restrictions for a tort that
covers an uncommon situation and has elements difficult to
prove. Even if it is correct that the number of "true" false light
decisions is small, this may be because courts are reluctant to
protect a poorly-understood interest, not because actual claims
are weak. Moreover, a small number of successful claims
should not be an argument for eliminating legal protections.
181. See McKenna, supra note 76, at 139. Another author has gone so far
as to describe the false light interest as being the presentation of "a false or
incomplete image to others." Zuckman, supra note 39, at 260.
182. A commentator points out that in comparing defamation with invasion
of privacy, "the veracity of the defamatory statement is central in determining
whether one's reputation has been damaged," whereas falsity is "only periph-
eral in measuring the damage wrought on one's sensibilities by unwanted
publicity." Greenwood, supra note 109, at 682.
183. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998)
(citing Kelso, supra note 31, at 785-86).
184. See Kelso, supra note 31, at 886.
185. See id. at 880.
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CONCLUSION
Privacy is an increasingly scarce commodity in a crowded
and technologically advancing world. With the means of intru-
sion and publicity becoming ever more accessible, any privacy
protection available from the law should be secured to the full-
est possible extent. In Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., however,
the Minnesota Supreme Court created a harsh precedent,
paying scant attention to protecting the interests of individuals
whose privacy might be violated by false light publicity. Min-
nesota has signaled that it will not protect its private citizens
from false and offensive publicity unless they are defamed.
Threat of liability for false light invasion of privacy could
be an effective tool to help curb media abuses and would under-
score Minnesota's commitment to promoting respect among its
citizens by allowing them to determine for themselves how-
and whether-they are presented to the public. Recognizing
the other three forms of invasion of privacy is a step in the
right direction, but Minnesota has created a gap by not
permitting false light claims. The false light tort does not
menace First Amendment rights because it is heavily restricted
and supports few actionable grievances. Nor does it overlap
with torts such as defamation, which cannot remedy every
harm from false or misleading publicity. Defamation requires
proof of different elements and protects different interests. If
tortious conduct satisfies the elements. of both torts, this should
be no more a problem than other situations in which multiple
causes of action are available to plaintiffs. The false light tort
serves a unique need and protects a distinct interest-self-
determination. Other states should not follow Minnesota's lead
in rejecting this important tort.
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